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Abstract—The use of average data for dependability assess-
ments results in a outdated system-level dependability estimation
which can lead to incorrect design decisions. With increasing
availability of online data, there is room to improve traditional
dependability assessment techniques. Namely, prognostics is an
emerging field which provides asset-specific failure information
which can be reused to improve the system level failure es-
timation. This paper presents a framework for prognostics-
updated dynamic dependability assessment. The dynamic be-
haviour comes from runtime updated information, asset inter-
dependencies, and time-dependent system behaviour. A case study
from the power generation industry is analysed and results
confirm the validity of the approach for improved near real-time
unavailability estimations.
Index Terms—Prognostics, dynamic dependability, model to
model transformation, risk monitor, remaining useful life, con-
dition monitoring.
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
BDMP Boolean logic Driven Markov Processes
CB Circuit Breaker
CBFTA Condition Based Fault Tree Analysis
CDF Cumulative Distribution Function
DBN Dynamic Bayesian Networks
ETA Event Tree Analysis
FTA Fault Tree Analysis
HAZOP Hazard and Operability Study
IG Input Gate
PDF Probability Density Function
PHM Prognostics and Health Management
PS Power Supply
PSA Probabilistic Safety Assessment
RUL Remaining Useful Life
SAN Stochastic Activity Networks
SD Standard Deviation
SF6 Sulphur Hexafluoride
OG Output Gate
NOTATION
Li BDMP leaf i where i={F, SF}
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Gi Fault tree gate i in the BDMP model
Ti BDMP trigger i
Ni BDMP node i
TE Top-event
Input(Gi) Inputs of the gate Gi
Orig(Ti) Origin of the trigger i
Dest(Ti) Destination of the trigger i
λ Constant failure rate: working to failed state
λs Constant failure rate: stanbdy to failed state
µ Constant repair rate: failed to working or
standby state
W Working state
F Failed state
R Repair state
S Standby state
Pi Triggered Markov process of the leaf i
Zik(t) Homogeneous Markov process of the leaf i,
where k = {0, 1}
Aik State space of Zik
f ia→b Probability transfer function from process a to
process b of the leaf i
act SAN activation place
deact SAN deactivation place
faultStdBy SAN timed activity from standby to failed state
β Shape parameter of the Weibull distribution
η Scale parameter of the Weibull distribution
Tel Elapsed time of the conditional Weibull distri-
bution
F (t|Tel) Conditional failure probability at time instant t
given that Tel has already elapsed
Tp Prediction time
Tm Mission time
m(x) Marking of the SAN place x
Fx Failure event of the component x
Rx Repair event of the component x
FAA Insulation paper aging acceleration factor
ΘHt Hotspot temperature at time instant t
Lt RUL at time instant t
ξt Process noise at time instant t
Θto Top oil temperature
∆Θto/a,R Temperature difference between top oil and
ambient at rated current
K Ratio of measured load to rated load
m Cooling mode of the transformer
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SYSTEM dependability is a term that encompasses a rangeof attributes which include safety, reliability, availability,
maintainability, confidentiality, and integrity [1]. We will not
consider confidentiality and integrity attributes because secu-
rity aspects are outside of the scope of this paper. In the
nuclear industry, a key tool for dependability assessment is
a process called Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA). PSA
employs a combination of Event Tree Analysis (ETA) and
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) to address reliability and safety.
In their traditional forms, both techniques are inadequate and
inaccurate when dealing with dynamic failure scenarios and
system operation. Classical FTA is a combinatorial technique,
i.e., focused on analysis of combinations as opposed to a
sequence of failures and does not have effective means for
representation of mode and state changes. Classical ETA
explores successful or failed responses to a sequence of
failures but, mathematically speaking, sequences are treated
as combinations of events [2].
To enable a more accurate analysis of dynamic scenarios
that include mode and state changes as well as sequencing of
failures, several techniques for dynamic dependability analysis
have emerged as alternatives to a classical PSA. Dynamic Fault
Trees and Boolean Driven Markov Processes are examples
of prominent emerging techniques [3]. Despite the advances
made in this field, even recent dynamic techniques only
provide a prediction of the dependability that is established
a priori, i.e., before system deployment using average past
operational data typically drawn from reliability databases.
This prediction, however, leads to inaccurate estimates of
system dependability attributes such as system safety and
reliability that ignore the operational history and state of
components used in the specific system.
In this paper, we argue that the increasing capabilities for
condition monitoring and the availability of operational data
in many engineering fields [4]-[6] create opportunities for
changing this situation by forming a more accurate picture of
the health of the system as it evolves during operation. Data
from multiple sensors and monitoring systems can improve
dependability prediction and inform maintenance planning.
Prognostics and Health Management (PHM) is a collection
of activities focused on the system degradation management
including the following main groups of activities [7], [8]:
• Anomaly detection: monitoring and detection of abnor-
mal conditions in the system operation.
• Diagnosis: if an anomaly is detected, diagnose the cause
of the fault.
• Prognostics: predict the likely future degradation of the
component and estimate its remaining useful life.
• Operation and maintenance planning: mitigate the effects
of failure and reduce unnecessary planned maintenance.
PHM techniques have emerged as promising solutions for
cost-effective asset management. Traditionally a substantial
focus of PHM has been on anomaly detection and diagnosis
techniques applied in different fields such as nuclear [9], power
transmission [10], or spacecraft [11]. During the last years
there has been an increased interest in prognostics across
different fields [12], [13]. The focus of this paper is on
prognostics because it can be used within the dependability
assessment process integrating up-to-date health data and
likely future degradation predictions. We will not focus on
maintenance planning, but obtained results can be used for
predictive and condition-based maintenance planning [14].
Prognostics is a relatively immature field, where few suc-
cessful industrial implementations exist [12] while dependabil-
ity analysis and PSA are well-known areas where many suc-
cessful implementations exist across different industries [15].
Although the two share the goal of improving dependability
attributes, there are differences between prognostics and PSA
techniques. Table I summarizes these differences in four areas:
scope of application, inputs, supported maintenance strategies,
and outcomes.
TABLE I
PROGNOSTICS VS DEPENDABILITY ANALYSIS AND PSA
Properties Prognostics Dependability Analysis
and PSA
Scope of
application Components Components and systems
Inputs
Operational data,
component degradation
equations
Component failure data,
system fault propagation
models
Maintenance
Condition-based and
predictive maintenance
based on parameter
monitoring and
degradation forecast
Predetermined
maintenance based on
mathematical planning of
maintenance schedules
Outcomes
Prolonged useful life,
increased reliability and
availability of components
Global prediction and
management of reliability
and safety of the system
There are several asset-specific prognostics applications
reported in the literature. For instance, transformer prognos-
tics has the potential to improve maintenance planning and
potentially extend the useful life of power transformers [16].
However, the effects of prognostics at the system-level cannot
be easily or automatically established and quantified. There
are many elements in a power network, so the improve-
ment achieved in the performance of a specific asset via
prognostics does not automatically lead to understanding the
positive effects in the system context. This latter knowledge
is important for gaining assurance about dependability and for
designing system-level prognostic and maintenance strategies
in a rational, evidenced way that verifiably achieves improved
trade-offs between costs and system dependability.
The input data for prognostics comes from sensors and
degradation equations that determine the asset-specific degra-
dation behaviour, whereas for system dependability analysis
estimates of component failure probability are established
from generic databases with population-based component re-
liability values. From the viewpoint of system dependability
engineering, refining the estimates with real-time or near real-
time condition monitoring asset-specific information would be
beneficial, as it would provide a more realistic quantification of
the system failure probability, and accordingly a more accurate
dependability assessment [17].
The planning of maintenance supported by prognostics and
dependability analysis is different [18], [19]. Dependability
approaches support predetermined maintenance strategies in
accordance with established intervals of time, but without pre-
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vious condition investigation. Prognostics integrates usefully
with predictive and condition-based maintenance techniques,
extending the useful life of assets by postponing the replace-
ment instant where possible within acceptable thresholds and
reducing maintenance costs. However, prognostics focuses on
components and ignores the system effects of maintenance.
Finally, in terms of outcomes prognostics results are nor-
mally focused on the estimation and improvement of the
remaining useful life of a component, whereas dependability
analysis uses system models to establish global estimates of
dependability attributes such as reliability, availability, main-
tainability, and safety.
This paper presents work which develops a state-of-the-art
dynamic system dependability analysis technique to improve
accuracy of prediction via component-level prognostics.
We use the Boolean Driven Markov Process (BDMP) for-
malism [20] for expressing a system dependability prediction
model that can be developed by designers and analysts of the
system. BDMP is a strong dynamic dependability technique
sometimes considered as a generalization of Dynamic Fault
Trees [20] but does not currently support the integration of
prognostics concepts. To address this need, we connect this
framework to the formalism of Stochastic Activity Networks
(SAN) [21]. SAN is supported by a powerful computational
tool that can quantitatively analyse models and establish de-
pendability estimates using simulation techniques [22]. In this
approach, prognostics results are regularly extracted during the
system operation and are used to update component failure
probabilities in the system dependability prediction model.
Using new observations of a plant, the dependability estimates
for the future trajectory of the system can be updated. This
approach provides improved prediction of dependability. The
approach has been applied to a case study from the nuclear
power industry.
The main contribution of this paper is the integration of a
state-of-the-art dynamic dependability analysis technique with
prognostics. The second contribution of the paper is the tech-
nical model transformation algorithm from BDMP models into
SAN models which enables computational operationalization
of the proposed approach, but can also be useful in a broader
context.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section II
presents the approach for prognostics-updated dynamic de-
pendability analysis. Section III includes a case study from
the power generation industry. Section IV discusses this work
in the context of other relevant work. Finally, Section VI draws
conclusions and identifies future research challenges.
II. AN APPROACH TO DYNAMIC DEPENDABILITY
ANALYSIS ENCOMPASSING PROGNOSTICS
Fig. 1 sketches the proposed prognostics-updated dynamic
dependability analysis approach. The system design is the
starting point of the dependability analysis process. It defines
the functional operation of the system specifying how assets
are arranged to perform the system function. Two parallel
sequences of activities on system dependability modelling and
prognostics follow the system design and at some point join
to complete the approach.
System
Design
Adaptation
Asset selection
Prognostics Techniques
Assets
Prognostics Results
Parametrized
Prognostics Results
System-level Results
Evaluation
Update
Prognostics-updated SAN model
Dynamic
Dependability
Model
Transformation
Stochastic
Activity
Networks
Qualitative
Dependability
Assessment
Fig. 1. Prognostics-updated dynamic dependability analysis approach.
The first step of the prognostic sequence is asset selection.
For the different assets that constitute the system design, the
designer may have different degradation specifications. To
specify a prognostics model, degradation equations or run-to-
failure data are compulsory [13]. Therefore, the asset selection
activity for prognostics evaluation is driven by the availability
of data or equations. According to the available resources
different prognostics techniques can be considered to design
a prognostics model for each asset.
At the system level, in order to perform the dynamic
dependability analysis, the first step is the qualitative depend-
ability assessment. In dynamic dependability analysis we are
interested in finding the minimal (temporal) combination of
failures of assets that causes the system failure, i.e., minimal
cut-sequence sets [23]. A number of techniques have been
proposed for calculating these sets, so in this paper we
will focus on the prognostic-updated quantification of already
established minimal cut-sequence sets.
Minimal cut-sequence sets are represented with a dynamic
dependability model defining the system failure behaviour as
a function of assets failure occurrences linked with temporal
operators. In the dynamic dependability model the failure
specification of each asset is initialized with average reliability
values taken from reliability databases. BDMP is the formal-
ism used in this paper for the representation and evaluation of
the dependability of complex dynamic systems.
Moving back to the prognostic sequence, prognostics results
depend on the nature of the prognostics estimation tech-
nique. Different approaches provide alternative representations
of the remaining useful life which may include uncertainty
representation mechanisms. In order to connect asset-specific
results of any prognostics technique with system-level results
an adaptation activity is essential. This activity parametrizes
prognostics results so that they can be used directly to update
dynamic dependability evaluation models.
To evaluate prognostics-updated system-level failure prob-
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ability, the transformation from the dynamic dependability
evaluation model into Stochastic Activity Networks (SAN)
model is performed. SAN has a generic and flexible semantic
framework that allows the encoding of a range of different
dynamic dependability and performance evaluation formalisms
[24]-[26]. Accordingly, we can define transformation rules for
the transformation of these formalisms into SAN generalizing
the application of the approach. This way, we avoid restricting
our approach to the assumptions of different dynamic depend-
ability evaluation techniques.
Taking the parametrized prognostics results, the dynamic
dependability evaluation model in SAN is updated through
advanced simulation practices. The updated SAN model in-
cludes mechanisms to resample dynamically the probability
distribution parameters during the simulation time, enabling
the integration of parametrized prognostics results at runtime.
Finally the system-level evaluation is performed to quantify
the combination of assets that lead the system to failure.
The system-level results are specified with the Cumulative
Distribution Function (CDF) of the system failure probability.
Using basic reliability theory, it is possible to extract the
Probability Density Function (PDF) of the system, from which
system reliability, availability, and where appropriate safety
can be estimated.
A. Prognostics Techniques and Adaptation of Prognostics
Results
The main output of prognostics techniques is the Remaining
Useful Life (RUL), i.e., prediction of the time to failure of an
asset which is deployed in some specific conditions at a spe-
cific time instant. Prognostics techniques require a prediction
model of the asset degradation process and a failure threshold
to determine the remaining time to failure of the asset from the
current prediction instant. Prognostics techniques can be clas-
sified into data-driven and model-based approaches based on
the available engineering resources, i.e. run-to-failure data and
physics-of-failure equations respectively. Hybrid approaches
result from the combination of data-driven and model-based
prognostics techniques. See [12], [13] for an overview of
prognostics techniques.
Depending on the nature of the prognostics technique the
RUL is estimated in different formats. Depending on the
format, different transformation steps would be needed to
integrate prognostics results into the dynamic dependability
analysis model. A review of formats and examples of tech-
niques for the RUL specification are given in [27]; they include
deterministic RUL value (e.g. calculated employing neural
networks [12]), deterministic RUL value with confidence
intervals (e.g. estimated with autoregressive-moving-average
models [12]), or PDF of the RUL (e.g. derived using particle
filters [16]).
When predicting the future behaviour of the system via
prognostics, there are different sources of uncertainty that
influence the RUL prediction. Therefore, uncertainty has an
important role when estimating the system RUL. Accordingly,
the PDF of the RUL is preferable to the fixed constant
RUL estimation because the PDF includes information about
the possible variability of the system and the deterministic
RUL specifies a single point estimation [28]. Parametrized
distributions are necessary to model, integrate, and propagate
prognostics results into dynamic dependability models.
The deterministic RUL estimation is used together with
the exponential distribution assuming that the constant failure
rate is the inverse of the RUL (λ ≈ 1/RUL) [29]. In
this case, it is assumed that a component with an estimated
constant value of RUL, fails in time following the exponential
distribution with a constant failure rate of λ ≈ 1/RUL. When
the deterministic RUL is obtained with confidence intervals,
the same adaptation is applied, but this time calculating the
minimum and maximum failure rates that correspond to the
confidence intervals.
When the prognostics technique provides the PDF of the
RUL, it can be adapted with a generic probability distribution
to specify the failure behaviour of an asset. The Weibull PDF
is considered general enough to integrate different distributions
(e.g., exponential, Rayleigh) [30]. However, if the RUL is
estimated from physics-of-failure equations (i.e., model-based
prognostics approaches), the PDF should be chosen in agree-
ment with the asset-specific prognostics degradation equation.
When adapting the RUL with the failure PDF, the variance
of the PDF specifies the degradation behaviour of the asset.
For instance, if the variance of the RUL is narrow (which is
common for accurate RUL predictions) its corresponding CDF
models an asset that degrades almost instantaneously (i.e., the
time from failure-free operation to the total-failure operation
is determined by this variance) and vice versa.
For a real-time risk monitor reaction times are crucial to
take timely remedial actions. As the system assets deteriorate,
early indicators are needed to prevent the occurrence of system
failure events. If the PDF of the RUL has a narrow variance
and this PDF is used as the failure specification of the asset,
this specification may prevent the designer from establishing
a safety failure threshold and acting accordingly.
Therefore, depending on the available RUL specifications
design decisions need to be adopted between the direct trans-
formation of the RUL via Weibull regression [31] and asset-
specific physics-of-failure degradation equation according to
the variance of the PDF of the RUL estimation.
B. Dynamic Dependability Models
Once the component failure data has been updated with
prognostics, system-level dependability analysis can follow.
The BDMP is chosen as a dynamic dependability model for
this purpose. BDMP is a powerful development in the state-
of-the-art which can be seen as a generalization of various
types of recent proposed notations for representing Dynamic
Fault Trees and therefore deemed appropriate for the purposes
of this work.
1) Preliminaries on BDMP: A BDMP model [32] is de-
fined by a 4-tuple 〈L,G, T, TE〉 where:
• L = {Li} is the set of leaves which can be of two types:
F leaves (failure can occur only in active mode - LF ) and
SF leaves (failure can occur only in active and standby
mode - LSF ): L = LSF ∪ LF .
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• G = {Gi} is the set of fault tree gates which can be
of two types: OR and AND: G = GOR ∪ GAND. Each
gate Gi has at least two inputs which are defined by
Inputs(Gi) ⊆ N. The set of nodes N = L∪G in a BDMP
model are defined as the union of leaves and gates.
• T = {Ti} is the set of triggers of a BDMP model. A trig-
ger Ti has an origin Orig(Ti) and a destination Dest(Ti).
Both these elements are nodes from N . A trigger Ti is
defined by a 2-tuple (Orig(Ti), Dest(Ti)) ∈ N2.
• TE is the top-event, i.e., failure of the modelled system.
Dynamic dependencies in BDMP come from the trigger
mechanism which combines fault trees and Markov models
with flexible mathematical properties [20]. The trigger signal
is activated by a Boolean function determined by the failure
occurrence of its origin elements (which can be comprised of
a leaf or more generally origin elements can be subsystems
including interconnected leaves, gates and triggers). The acti-
vation of the trigger affects the destination leaves by changing
the Markovian process associated with each leaf.
Namely, each leaf Li of the BDMP tree is represented
with a Markov process Pi called a triggered Markov process
[20]. Pi is comprised of the following set of elements:
{Zi0(t), Z
i
1(t), f
i
0→1, f
i
1→0}.
{Zi0(t), Z
i
1(t)} are two homogeneous Markov processes.
For k ∈ {0, 1}, the state-space of {Zi0(t), Zi1(t)} is Aik. For
each Aik (i ∈ L, k ∈ {0, 1}) we will need to refer to a part
F ik of the state space Aik. Generally, F ik will correspond to the
failure states of the component or subsystem modelled by the
process Pi.
f i0→1 and f i1→0 are two probability transfer functions de-
fined as follows:
• for any x ∈ Ai0, f i0→1(x) is a probability distribution on
Ai1, such that if x ∈ F i0, then Pr(f i0→1(x) ∈ F i1)=1
• for any x ∈ Ai1, f i1→0(x) is a probability distribution on
Ai0, such that if x ∈ F i1, then Pr(f i1→0(x) ∈ F i0)=1
The triggered Markov process switches instantaneously
from one of its modes to the other one, via the relevant transfer
function, according to the state of some externally defined
Boolean variable, i.e. process selectors or triggers.
Fig. 2 (a) shows the Markov processes for an SF leaf and
an F leaf. Informally we can denote process 1 as a required
mode and process 0 as a non-required mode. In the required
mode both leaves transit from the working to the failed state
with the corresponding failure rate λ (process 1 in Fig. 2 (a)).
In the non-required mode, the SF leaf can also transit from the
standby state to the failed state with λs. This is not possible in
the case of the F leaf, as it does not have a standby state in the
non-required mode and only the transition from failed state to
working state is allowed in this mode (process 0 in Fig. 2 (a)).
Both leaves pass from the failed state to working (process 1)
or standby states (process 0) according to the repair rate (µ).
Fig. 2 (b) shows an example of a BDMP model with an
actively operating leaf A (initially with process 1 in Fig. 2(a))
whose failure affects leaf B (F leaf process 0 in Fig. 2(a))
and leaf C (SF leaf process 0 in Fig. 2(a)) via the trigger
mechanism (graphically depicted with a dashed arrow). Until
the failure occurrence of leaf A, leaf B cannot fail and leaf C
is not operating actively. Once leaf A fails, leaf B and leaf C
change their operation to the required mode (i.e., process 1 in
Fig. 2 (a)) and they operate actively with their corresponding
failure and repair rates. If leaf A is repaired before the failure
of leaf B or leaf C, both leaf B and leaf C return back to
operate according to the process 0. The top-event occurs when
leaf A is in a failed state and simultaneously leaf B or leaf C
fails. The model is formally defined as: L = {LA, LB, LC};
G = {GOR, GAND}; T = {T1}; where T1 = {LA, GOR}.
!
!
SF !
TE
B
A
C
OR
AND
1S F W F
W F
W F
!
F Leaf
SF !
SF Leaf
Process 0 Process 1Leaves
(b)(a)
λ
λ
μ μ
μμ
λS
Fig. 2. (a) BDMP leaves and associated Markov processes; (b) BDMP
example.
The numerical solution of BDMP models focus on the
quantification of the underlying overall Markovian model.
Owing to the mathematical properties of BDMP, the state-
space is decreased by trimming irrelevant events and reducing
the combinatorial explosion [20]. Using the KB3 tool the
BDMP model is automatically transformed into the Figaro
language which can be solved analytically or via Monte Carlo
simulation depending on the properties of the BDMP model
[33].
BDMP is a strong dynamic dependability analysis formal-
ism with well-defined mathematical properties [20]. However,
to the best of authors’ knowledge there is no possibility to
integrate directly prognostics predictions into BDMP. This
limitation comes from the decision of designing a high-level
dynamic dependability analysis formalism. BDMP encodes
the dynamic logic with user-friendly modelling constructs
(triggers and leaves) simplifying the design of dynamic de-
pendability models.
C. Transformation into Stochastic Activity Networks
In order to integrate runtime information of prognostics
models into the dynamic dependability evaluation model, it
is necessary to regularly update component failure predictions
according to prognostics. The Stochastic Activity Networks
formalism provides a sufficient modelling and analysis mech-
anism to integrate prognostics results into the dynamic de-
pendability evaluation model intuitively [21].
1) Preliminaries on Stochastic Activity Networks: Stochas-
tic Activity Networks (SAN) was first introduced in the mid-
1980s [34] and it has been used for many different appli-
cations. For the sake of readability and simplicity we will
introduce the main SAN modelling constructs informally in
this subsection. For a formal definition of the SAN main
constructs refer to the Appendix.
SAN extends stochastic Petri Nets generalizing the stochas-
tic relationships and adding mechanisms to construct hierar-
chical models. Fig. 3 shows SAN modelling primitives [21].
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Standard Place Extended Place Input Gate Output Gate
Join
Join
Instantaneous
Activity
Timed
Activity
Submodel
model
Atomic/
Composed
Fig. 3. Notation of SAN elements.
Places represent the state of the modelled system. Each
place contains a certain number of tokens defining the marking
of the place. A standard place contains an integer number
of tokens, whereas extended places contain data types other
than integers (e.g., floats, array). We will denote the marking
function of the place x as m(x), e.g., m(x)=1 means that the
place x has a marking equal to 1.
There are two types of activities: instantaneous which
complete in negligible amount of time, and timed whose
duration has an effect on the system performance and their
completion time can be a constant or a random value. When
it is a random value, it is ruled by a probability distribution
function defining the time to fire the activity.
Activities fire based on the conditions defined over the
marking of the net and their effect is to modify the marking of
the places. The completion of an activity of any kind is enabled
by a particular marking of a set of places. The presence of at
least one token in each input place enables the firing of the
activity removing the token from its input place(s) and placing
them in the output place(s).
Each activity has a reactivation function that defines when
the activity is aborted and a new activity time is immediately
obtained from the activity time distribution. The reactivation
function provides a mechanism for restarting activities that
have been activated, either with the same or a different dis-
tribution. To this end it is necessary that both the reactivation
predicate holds for the new marking and for the marking in
which the activity was originally activated; and the activity
remains enabled (see Figure 8 for an example).
Another way to enable a certain activity consists of input
gates and output gates. Input and output gates make the SAN
formalism general and powerful enough to model complex
real situations. They determine the marking of the net based
on user-defined C++ rules.
Input Gates (IG) control the enabling of activities and
define the marking changes that will occur when an activity
completes. A set of places is connected to the input gate and
the input gate is connected to an activity. A Boolean condition
(or guard) enables the activity connected to the gate and a
function determines the effect of the activity completion on
the marking of the places connected to the gate. Output Gates
(OG) specify the effect of activity completion on the marking
of the places connected to the output gate. An output function
defines the marking changes that occur when the activity
completes.
The performance measurements are carried out through
reward functions defined over the designed model. Reward
functions are evaluated as the expected value of the reward
function and they are defined based on:
• the marking of the net (state reward function), e.g.
quantification of the probability for being in a specific
place;
• completion of activities (impulse reward function), e.g.
count the number of times an activity triggers within a
time interval.
In order to alleviate substantially the state explosion prob-
lem SAN makes use of reduced base models [35]. This concept
enables the implementation of join operators and hierarchical
modelling of complex systems.
Fig. 4 shows a simple repairable system example (i.e.
process 1 in Fig. 2 (a)). In this case the SAN places are
initialized to working state <m(W), m(F)> = <1, 0>. The
token will move from W to the F place according to the CDF
determined by the fault timed activity. The time to failure
will be calculated with the parameters of the fault activity
and after the time to failure has elapsed the system will move
to the failed state <0, 1>. After moving to the failure state
the time to repair will be calculated from the repair timed
distribution and the token will move from F to the W place
after the calculated time to repair has elapsed.
if (m(F)==1)
 F_Rew+=1;
if (m(W)==1)
 W_Rew+=1;
Reward function examples
Fig. 4. Repairable system example in SAN.
In this paper we focus on Monte Carlo simulations for
the quantification of different probabilities. If we want to
evaluate the unavailability or availability we can use the reward
functions indicated in Fig. 4 with F_Rew and W_Rew reward
variables respectively. These statements are evaluated for a
large number of Monte Carlo trials and the expected value of
these random variables evaluated at different time instants will
give the unavailability and availability indicators. Note that
the required number of iterations will depend on the required
confidence level for the reward variables.
The inverse transform sampling method [36] extracts the
stochastic occurrence times of timed activities using Monte
Carlo simulations. Let CDF be a cumulative distribution
function, r be a random variable drawn from the uniform
distribution r ∼ U([0, 1]), and TTF the time to fire the
activity. Then, the inverse sampling method applies the relation
F−1(r) = TTF to draw the time to fire according to the CDF.
The SAN models which include the specified SAN el-
ements are modelled in a SAN atomic model (see Fig. 5
Reusable Block column). The join operator links through a
compositional tree structure different SAN models in a unique
composed model. As shown in Fig. 6 places of different atomic
models are joined to represent interactions between different
SAN models. It is possible to link atomic models, composed
models, or combinations thereof. In the tree structure, the
composed and atomic SAN models are linked through join
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operators using shared places between the composed and
atomic SAN models. Thus, the analyst can focus on specific
characteristics of the system behaviour through fit-for-purpose
atomic and composed models and later join independently
validated models to obtain a more complex composed system
model.
The SAN model in Fig. 4 can be reused so as to link
the places with other components. For instance, if we want
to initiate another (timed or immediate) activity in another
component when the failure of the model in Fig. 4 occurs, we
can join the F place with the destination SAN model through
the SAN join mechanism (see Fig. 6 for an example). For the
composed system the quantification of system probabilities is
exactly the same as for the simple system in Fig. 4.
2) Transformation from BDMP into SAN: Fig. 5 shows the
BDMP to SAN dictionary including: state machine models,
SAN models with input and output gate specifications, and the
reusable building block which is later on used to synthesize
BDMP models from SAN models. For clarity we do not have
named instantaneous activities in the SAN models.
The only difference between F and SF leaves is the inclu-
sion of the transition from Standby (S) to the Failed (F) state
caused by the faultStdBy timed activity (see dashed lines in
Fig. 5). Initially leaves can be either in Working (W) or standby
state. Accordingly, the markings of SAN places are initial-
ized to (<m(W), m(S), m(F), m(act), m(deact)>): working
(<1, 0, 0, 0, 0>); or standby (<0, 1, 0, 0, 0>) states. The IG
and OG specification determines the marking changes that are
done when the activity linked to the IG (or OG) fires. That is,
the marking will be updated according to the Check Deact
output gate when the repair activity fires. Besides, note that
if m(W)=1 and m(deact)=1 then m(S)=1 instantaneously.
If the F leaf is not the destination element of a trigger, then
the SAN model reduces to the model shown in Fig. 4, i.e.
always in required mode or process 1 in Fig. 2 (a). If the F
leaf is the destination element of a trigger, as shown in Fig. 5
we use a standby state to model the situation in which the leaf
is operating in non-required mode or process 0 in Fig. 2 (a).
The detailed behaviour of the Boolean (AND, OR) gates
is described by the state machine, where a doubled cir-
cle indicates the failure state, and Fx and Rx indicate the
failure and repair events of the component x respectively.
For both gates the initial state is assumed to be healthy
(<m(A), m(B), m(Y)> = <0, 0, 0>). These gates can be
easily generalized adding more places to the SAN model and
changing the IG specification accordingly.
Finally, a simplified version of the BDMP’s trigger construct
is modelled. It is assumed that the trigger has an origin event
FT which activates and deactivates the trigger. In SAN an extra
place is needed to control the status of the trigger, i.e., s_act,
s_deact places for activation and deactivation respectively.
Note that the act and deact places cannot be used because
these are shared with the destination element that will be
triggered.
Any BDMP model can be synthesized into an equivalent
SAN model using the building blocks in Fig. 5 and based on
the shared places and hierarchical modelling concepts of SAN.
Fig. 6 shows an example of the composition of SAN models.
BDMP leaves Tr1 and Tr2 are modelled using the F leaf
SAN building block. The trigger that goes from Tr1 to Tr2 is
modelled using the Trig construct, sharing act and deact
places of the Trig model (activated by the F place of the Tr1)
with the act and deact places of Tr2 model. That is, when
the failure of Tr1 occurs this activates Tr2 and when Tr1 is
repaired the trigger deactivates Tr2.
Then, the reusable composed SAN model Trig_Tr is
connected with the AND gate to create the TE. That is, AND
will be true (i.e. m(Y)=1 in Fig. 5 second row) when both
Tr1 and Tr2 are in failed state simultaneously, i.e. m(F)=1
in Fig. 6. Generalizing this simple example, it is possible to
parse systematically a BDMP model to find its equivalent SAN
model.
As the BDMP model is acyclic, the failure logic is calcu-
lated at each level starting from the bottom leaf-level up to
the top-event level. Algorithm 1 defines the synthesis process
assuming that all the gates are ordered hierarchically bottom-
up (for clarity we have not included shared states in the
algorithm, but these are shared as depicted in Fig. 6) using
a set of functions subsequently defined.
Algorithm 1 uses the following set of functions:
• Out1=PropagateTrigger(In1); in the BDMP model In1,
for each trigger Ti ∈ T with a gate as a destination
element, it propagates the effect of the trigger down to
the leaf-level and saves the new BDMP model in Out1.
After propagating the trigger, the destination elements of
every trigger will be leaves, e.g., in the BDMP model of
Fig. 2 (b), the trigger that goes from leaf A to the OR
gate is replaced with two triggers going from leaf A to
leaf B and leaf C.
• Out1=Transform(In1, In2); transforms each BDMP el-
ement in model In1 (Li ∈ L, Gi ∈ G, Ti ∈ T ) into
a vector Out1 with SAN equivalent elements using the
given transformation dictionary In2 (cf. Fig. 5). With this
function we get a set of independent BDMP models in
SAN. Hierarchical information of the BDMP model is
stored in the input and output of gates and triggers.
• Out1=Leaves(In1); stores in Out1 all the leaves
(Li ∈ L) that are in the vector In1 as SAN elements.
• Out1=Inputs(In1, In2); stores in Out1 the input nodes
of the gate In1 located in the vector In2 as SAN
elements.
• Out1=Join(In1, In2,. . . ,InN ); implements the join oper-
ation between the inputs {In1, In2,. . . ,InN}, and creates
the reusable composed SAN model Out1 (cf. Fig. 6).
• SetInitState(In1, init); sets the initial state to init to the
leaf In1.
• Out1=Orig(In1); finds the origin node of the trigger In1
and stores in Out1.
• Out1=Dest(In1); finds the destination node of the trigger
In1 and stores in Out1.
• Out1=getSubtree(In1, In2); extracts the subtree Out1
from the given tree In2, starting from the given node
In1 downwards until the leaf-level.
Algorithm 1 proceeds as follows in the BDMP model shown
in Fig. 6:
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Fig. 5. BDMP to SAN dictionary: building blocks.
• Line 2: there is no need to further propagate the trigger
effect.
• Line 3: the variable vec BDMP SAN is set according
to the dictionary in Fig. 5; vec BDMP SAN = [Tr1, Tr2,
Trig, AND].
• Line 4: the variable tree SAN is directly assigned:
tree SAN = {[Tr1], [Tr2]}.
• Lines 5-9: the BDMP model consists of a single gate.
Thus, the SAN tree variables are updated as: input nodes1
= [Tr1, Tr2]; subtree1 = [join, AND, Tr1, Tr2]; and
tree SAN = subtree1.
• Lines 10-14: the initial state of Tr1 is set to Active
and Tr2 is set to Standby.
• Lines 15-17: the unique trigger in the BDMP model
is created linking origin and destination variables:
subtreeo = [Tr1]; subtreed = [Tr2]; trigger = [join, Trig,
Tr1, Tr2].
• Line 18: the SAN trigger variable is added to the pre-
viously created SAN tree of the BDMP model; tree SAN
= {[join, Trig, Tr1, Tr2], [join, AND, Tr1, Tr2]}.
The synthesis Algorithm 1 along with the BDMP to SAN
dictionary in Fig. 5 presents the correspondence between
BDMP and SAN models. This transformation has benefits for
both formalisms. SAN is a generic and powerful formalism
that can be adapted to model different dynamic dependability
models. However, this generality comes with modelling costs.
The proposed transformation process enables the synthesis of
SAN models that implement BDMP models, which alleviates
the modelling costs and enables the analysis of complex
systems in a user-friendly manner. BDMP models can make
use of SAN constructs to extend the formalism and analyse
situations which cannot be handled with BDMP, e.g., dynam-
ically updated dependability estimates.
D. Prognostics-updated Failure Specification of Assets
BDMP leaf nodes model the assets under study and these are
defined by a triggered Markov process (see Subsection II-B1).
Depending on the type of the leaf and if the leaf node is a
destination element of a trigger mechanism or not, the state-
space of the leaf is different.
In the most complex case (see Fig. 5, first row) the BDMP
leaf includes working, failed and standby places,
fault, repair and faultstandby timed activities, and also
act and deact instantaneous activities. In the simplest case,
i.e. a F leaf node without trigger influence, the leaf model in
Fig. 5 is reduced to the model shown in Fig. 4.
In both cases, the transition from working (W) to failed (F)
state is triggered by a fault timed activity. The repair
timed activity can transit from failed (F) to standby (S) or
working (W) state depending on if the leaf is the destination
element of a trigger mechanism or not respectively. Both
failure and repair timed activities are fully specified by the
CDF of the failure and repair distribution.
Prognostics studies are performed regularly throughout the
lifetime of the asset, and updated with online information.
The link between prognostics and dynamic dependability
assessment addressed in this paper focuses on updating the de-
pendability model with asset-specific characteristics obtained
from prognostics analyses. That is, the CDF parameters of the
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Algorithm 1 Synthesis of SAN models from a BDMP model
1: function SYNTHESIZE SAN(BDMP model, dictionary)
2: BDMP2=PropagateTrigger(BDMP model); ⊲ propagate triggers’ destination to the leaf level
3: vec BDMP SAN=Transform(BDMP2, dictionary); ⊲ transform BDMP elements into SAN
4: tree SAN=Leaves(vec BDMP SAN); ⊲ store all the leaves in the vector
5: for each Gi ∈ G do ⊲ parse all the gates bottom-up
6: input nodesi=Inputs(Gi, tree SAN); ⊲ take all input SAN elements of the gate Gi
7: subtreei=Join(vec BDMP SAN(Gi), input nodesi); ⊲ link gate Gi with inputs in SAN
8: tree SAN=tree SAN ∪ subtreei ⊲ nest in the tree the generated subtree in SAN
9: end for ⊲ at this point the BDMP model is created without triggers and initial states
10: for each Li ∈ L do ⊲ set the initial state of every leaf initially to active
11: SetInitState(tree SAN(Li), ‘Active’);
12: end for
13: for each Ti ∈ T do ⊲ now add the trigger effects and standby states
14: SetInitState(tree SAN(Dest(Ti)), ‘StandBy’); ⊲ set to standby destination leaves
15: subtreeo=getSubtree(Orig(Ti), tree SAN); ⊲ get SAN subtree of the origin of the trigger
16: subtreed=getSubtree(Dest(Ti), tree SAN); ⊲ get trigger destinations, i.e., SAN leaves
17: trigger=Join(Trig, subtreeo, subtreed); ⊲ join via trigger origin and destination
18: tree SAN=tree SAN ∪ trigger ⊲ nest in the tree
19: end for
20: return tree SAN
21: end function
Fig. 6. BDMP synthesis example.
failure distribution can be updated with prognostics prediction
results.
To this end, the following steps are implemented in SAN
and repeated until reaching the mission time Tm (cf. Fig. 7):
(a) pause the simulation time at the prognostics prediction
time (Tp);
(b) read and parametrize prognostics results;
(c) update the failure distribution parameters, resampling the
failure CDF according to the prognostics estimations.
After each update a new prognostics prediction time is ob-
tained from Tp’.
Fig. 7. Update process: (a) SAN engine; (b) prognostics reading; (c) resample
distribution.
Conditional distributions are needed to integrate the results
with the corresponding time shift because the updating process
is performed at different time instants. In this case, we
have updated the results according to the conditional Weibull
distribution given by
F (t|Tel) = 1− e
−[(
Tel+t
η
)β−(
Tel
η
)β ] (1)
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where β and η are the shape and scale parameters of the
Weibull distribution respectively, and Tel is the elapsed time
of operation up to the start of the new mission at t [30].
The updating process is implemented in SAN with some
advanced simulation practices. Based on the simulation time,
prediction times, and prognostics results; reactivation predi-
cates are determined so that the leaf takes new firing times
(i.e., time to fire of the fault activity in Fig. 5) ruled by
the updated distribution function at the prognostics-specified
prediction times.
For instance, if we assume that a component degrades ac-
cording to the exponential distribution, the failure distribution
parameters of the fault activity are updated dynamically
λ(t) =
{
λ0 0 < t < Tpi
λi t = Tpi
(2)
where λ0 is the initial failure rate estimate typically taken from
a reliability database, Tpi is the i-th prediction time instant,
and λi is the failure rate at i-th prediction time instant. The
number of prediction time instants depends on the specific
prognostics application (and available data) varying from 1 up
to P prediction instants i = {1, . . . , P}.
Fig. 8 shows a reactivation function example for a
non-repairable asset with OK and KO places initialized to
<m(OK)=1, m(KO)=0> and a fail timed activity defined
with an exponential distribution, with an initial failure rate λ0.
Any timed activity in SAN has the possibility to reactivate and
resample its distribution function, obtaining a new time to fire
[21]. In Fig. 8 this happens when the reactivation predicate
is true (m(Reactivate)=1) and the marking conditions to
enable the activity are satisfied (m(OK)=1). The asset block
is connected with the monitor block through Lambda and
Reactivate places. The monitor block is executed deter-
ministically every DeltaT time instant. The code embedded
in the Control output gate evaluates if the simulation time
(time) matches with prediction times (PredTimes) and
accordingly (i) enables the resampling of the Fail activity
through the Reactivate place and (ii) updates the marking
of the failure rate through the Lambda place. PredTimes
and PredValues store different prediction time instants and
values in numeric vectors, respectively.
The time to fire (TTF) of the activity changes throughout
the mission time: (a) at t0 the initial TTF0 is drawn from
the exponential distribution with rate λ0; (b) at tr1 a new
TTF1 is obtained from the exponential distribution with rate
λ1 extending the time to fire until t3; (c) at tr2 a new TTF2
is obtained from the exponential distribution with rate λ2
extending the time to fire until t5; (d) the overall TTF of
the activity lasts TTF = t5 − t0. This update process results
in updating the failure distribution at the stated reactivation
time instants (e.g. see an example in Fig. 18).
Note that the example in Fig. 8 models the resampling
process for the exponential distribution. Due to the memory-
less property of this distribution, there is no need to consider
conditional distributions. However, if other distributions are
deemed more appropriate, the corresponding conditional fail-
ure distribution parameters need to be updated according to
Fig. 8. Distribution resampling example.
prognostics prediction results, e.g. β(t) and η(t) parameters
for the conditional Weibull distribution as defined in (1).
Using the SAN reactivation mechanism along with the
prognostics prediction information for each leaf, we can up-
date the underlying triggered Markov process to include new
failure distribution parameters when prognostics predictions
are performed.
III. CASE STUDY: POWER SUPPLY OF ELECTRIC
DISTRIBUTION BOARD
The electric distribution board supplies power to the com-
ponents which support the cooling and the control functions
of a nuclear reactor core. Fig. 9 shows the configuration of
the power supply of an electric distribution board [32].
Electric
Trans ormer
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Fig. 9. Power supply of an electric distribution board [32].
A. Dynamic Dependability Evaluation Model
Failure to supply the power results in hazardous conse-
quences for the nuclear power plant. Fig. 10 shows the
correspondent BDMP model of the power supply divided into
hierarchical levels [32].
Failure of the active transformer Tr1 activates the standby
transformer Tr2. Anytime when the Tr1 is repaired, Tr2 returns
to the standby (or dormant) state. When the transformers (Tr1
and Tr2), distribution board (DBB1), or circuit breaker (CB1)
fail (see Fail PS DBB1 gate in Fig. 10), the standby diesel
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Fig. 10. BDMP model of the power supply in Fig. 9 [32].
supply is activated, comprised of a circuit breaker CB2 and a
Diesel generator. When any of the primary supply elements
are repaired (so that Fail PS DBB1=0); then CB2 and Diesel
return to standby state. Note that the Diesel supply can fail in
standby mode (SF leaf) while Tr2 cannot (F leaf).
Table II displays the failure rate figures used for the quan-
titative assessment assuming a mean time to repair of one day
for each asset.
TABLE II
FAILURE RATE VALUES OF THE ASSETS IN FIG. 9.
Asset λ (year-1)
Circuit breakers (CB1, CB2) 6.2e-1 y-1 [17]
Transformers (Tr1, Tr2) 1.2264e-2 y-1 [17]
Diesel 4.6428 y-1 [37]
Distribution boards (DBB1, DBA1) 8.76e-7 y-1 [38]
Note that the life expectancy of power transformers is much
longer than circuit breakers, diesel generators, and distribution
boards with an average lifetime of over fifty years [39], [40].
B. Transformation into SAN
The BDMP model in Fig. 10 is solved using the KB3 work-
bench through Monte Carlo simulations [33]. We generate
the equivalent Stochastic Activity Networks model applying
the synthesis Algorithm 1 to the BDMP model in Fig. 10 as
follows:
• Line 2: no need to propagate the trigger Trig1 from Tr1
to Tr2. Propagate the trigger effects in the BDMP model
from Fail PS DBB1 to CB2 and Diesel leaves through
dedicated triggers Trig2 and Trig3, respectively.
• Line 3: generate low-level equivalent SAN atomic
models using the dictionary in Fig. 5. vec BDMP SAN =
[DBA1, CB1, DBB1, Tr1, Tr2, CB2, Diesel, Trig1, Trig2,
Trig3, AND1, AND2, OR1, OR2, OR3]; where:
– F leaf: DBA1, CB1, DBB1, Tr1, Tr2, CB2;
– SF leaf: Diesel;
– Trigger: Trig1, Trig2, Trig3;
– AND: AND1, AND2;
– OR: OR1, OR2, OR3;
• Line 4: tree SAN={[DBA1], [CB1], [DBB1], [Tr1],
[Tr2], [CB2], [Diesel]}.
• Lines 5-9: tree SAN=subtree1; subtree1={join, OR1,
DBA1, subtree2}; subtree2={join, AND1, subtree3,
subtree4}; subtree3={join, OR2, CB1, DBB1, subtree5};
subtree4={join, OR3, CB2, Diesel}; subtree5={join,
AND2, Tr1, Tr2}.
• Lines 10-14: initial state of Tr1 is set to active, initial
states of Tr2, CB2, and Diesel are set to standby.
• Lines 15-17: trigger1 = [join, Trig1, Tr1, Tr2];
trigger2 = [join, Trig2, subtree3, CB2]; trigger3 = [join,
Trig3, subtree3, diesel].
• Line 18: tree SAN={[join, Trig1, Tr1, Tr2], [join,
Trig2, subtree3, CB2], [join, Trig3, subtree3, diesel],
subtree1}.
Fig. 11 shows the resultant composed SAN model. For
simplicity, in this figure we have omitted the atomic
models of trigger and Boolean gates and we have only
shown the atomic models of F and SF leaves created
in Line 3 of the Algorithm 1 using the dictionary in
Fig. 5. Note that both trigger2 and trigger3 mod-
els contain the Fail_PS_DBB1 model, which is shared
when linking with Fail_PS_Diesel via AND1 gate to
create the Fail_Supply_DBA1 model. Accordingly, the
Fail_PS_DBB1 model contains the Fail_Supply_DBB1
model showed in Fig. 6. For clarity, we have omitted the shared
states, but these also need to be created as showed in Fig. 6.
Tr2
CB2 Diesel
CB1
DBA1
DBB1
Tr1
Fig. 11. SAN composed model of the power supply in Fig. 9.
In order to validate the proposed algorithm and models, we
have quantified the BDMP model in Fig. 10 through the KB3
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON RELIABILITY 12
tool [33] and the equivalent SAN model in Fig. 11 using the
Mo¨bius tool through Monte Carlo simulations [22]. In SAN
the system-level unavailability is calculated by evaluating the
occurrence of the top-event (i.e., OR1 submodel in Fig. 11)
through reward variables (see Subsection II-C1). Fig. 12 shows
the system’s unavailability obtained using BDMP and the
equivalent SAN model.
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Fig. 12. Unavailability of the model in Fig. 10 solved via BDMP and SAN.
The unavailability of the SAN model falls within the bounds
of the BDMP estimation. Therefore, the values obtained with
BDMP and SAN are equivalent. Although evaluating a lifetime
of 200 years in industrial practice is unrealistic, we have
deliberately evaluated the performance of the model for the
long term so as to validate the created model. Both models
are evaluated with a confidence level of 0.99 and a confidence
interval of 1e-6. Table III displays the mean values shown in
Fig. 12.
TABLE III
MEAN VALUES IN FIG. 12
Time (Years) SAN (×10−5) BDMP (×10−5)
5 1.49 1.47
10 1.51 1.59
20 1.59 1.42
30 1.49 1.4
40 1.53 1.69
50 1.49 1.36
100 1.51 1.53
150 1.57 1.43
200 1.53 1.46
With a repair rate of one day, transformer failure has
little influence on the system unavailability. However, the true
repair rate for this size of transformer can be up to one year
[39], [40]. Therefore RUL predictions should be in a similar
timescale for timely maintenance action planning.
C. Asset-level Prognostics Models and Parametrization
For this case study, it is assumed that condition monitoring
is focused towards the end of expected life of the assets.
Accordingly, 59 years after the installation of the trans-
formers, different data-gathering systems were installed. One
year of data was used to diagnose the current health state
and predict the remaining useful life of the transformers.
Fig. 13. (a) Transformer top oil and ambient temperature samples. (b) Circuit
breaker SF6 density data.
The monitored variables include the current loading, top-oil
temperature and ambient temperature (see Fig. 13 (a)).
In parallel, 60 years after the installation of the power
transformers, the previous circuit breakers were replaced with
new ones which had monitoring sensors [41]. In this case, one
year of SF6 gas density data was calculated from measured gas
pressure and ambient temperature. The density of SF6 gas is
used to interrupt current flow in a circuit breaker [42]. When
this density drops to a predefined lockout level (i.e., 8192
mbar) it is no longer able to operate.
The first step was to analyse if a gas leak exits or not.
Generally, in the case of a leak, SF6 gas density decreases
linearly [43]. In order find an appropriate prognostics model,
we evaluate the monotonicity mono of the data as follows
[44]:
mono = mean(|
#positive ddt
n
−
#negative ddt
n
|) (3)
where n is the number of data windows in the dataset and t
is the time scale.
With a window of n = 10 samples, the monotonicity of
the available dataset is mono = 0.81 which confirms that the
degradation trend is linear. Based on the prognostics technique
selection approach in [13], we select linear regression as an
appropriate technique for the problem under study.
Therefore, the initial SF6 gas density data was divided
into blocks of data points, and a linear regression model
was applied to see the degradation over time [43]. This step
requires fitting a generic linear function to the data with the
form
yˆ = mx+ n± sd (4)
where yˆ is the predicted value of the dependent variable, m
is the slope of the line, x is the independent variable, n is the
y-intercept, and sd is the standard deviation of the density
sd =
√
E[(x− x)2] (5)
where x is the density data sample, x is the mean value of the
dataset and E denotes the expected value.
The linear regression involves finding the values of m and
n so that the sum of the squared prediction error SPE is
minimized
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SPE =
M∑
i=1
(yi − yˆi)
2 (6)
where M is the dataset length, yi is the historical value of the
dependent variable, and yˆi is as defined immediately above.
The slope parameter m was used to characterize the SF6
gas changes over time. If the slope was steeper than a certain
threshold, it was considered a true indicator of SF6 leak [43].
Fig. 13 (b) shows an example true indicator of an SF6 leak
and Fig. 14 shows the RUL estimation based on the linear
regression with different data samples.
Fig. 14. Circuit breaker prognostics results with predictions at different
prediction times. (a) Tp1 = 50 days. (b) Tp2 = 63 days.
Extending the predicted linear function up to the lockout
level (cf. Fig. 14), we get the RUL values displayed in
Table IV.
TABLE IV
PARAMETERIZATION OF RESULTS IN FIG. 14
Tp (days) RUL (days) SD (days)
Tp1 = 50 1118 82
Tp2 = 63 844 60
In this specific case, it can be seen that with more available
data the asset-degradation slope increases and the variance
decreases. The slope increment is caused by an increased SF6
gas leakage. However note that this is not a generalizable
effect and the asset-degradation depends on the asset-specific
operation. The reduction of the variance comes from the
increased certainty level of the predicted data which reduces
with more available data in this case.
Through the application of the linear regression model we
obtain single point RUL estimates. Accordingly when updating
the failure distributions of the circuit breakers we use the
values in Table IV as failure rate parameters of the exponential
distribution (see Subsection II-A). Namely, CB1 and CB2 are
implemented in SAN as BDMP F leaf models (see Fig. 10)
using Algorithm 1 and the dictionary in Fig. 5. As shown
in Fig. 11, the SAN models of CB1 and CB2 are different
because CB1 is not affected by the trigger mechanism.
The prognostics model of the transformer is based on the
aging of paper insulation which is the most critical failure for
power transformers [40], [45]. With time the paper becomes
more brittle, insulation integrity is lost, and the transformer
ceases its operation. IEEE C57.91 defines a paper aging
acceleration factor [46],
FAA = e
[
15000
383
−
15000
273+ΘH
]
(7)
where ΘH is the hotspot temperature in ◦C.
The probabilistic degradation of the system was analysed
based on the Bayesian particle filtering approach [16]. To
this end, it is necessary to rewrite the physics-of-failure
degradation equation (7) as a recurrence relation [16],
Lt = Lt−1 − e
[
(15000+ξt)(
1
383
−
1
1+ΘHt
)
]
(8)
where t is the time in service in hours, Lt is the RUL at time t,
ΘHt is the hotspot temperature at time t, and ξt is the process
noise.
The process noise models the variation in lifetime reduction
for a given hotspot temperature. This is caused by the small
differences in the activation energy required to break cellulose
chains. Therefore the process noise must account for the
uncertainties surrounding the activation energy process [16].
In this case a normal distribution with N (0, 20) was used.
The transformer hotspot temperature is not directly measur-
able and it is inferred from other parameters [46],
ΘH = Θto + (80−∆Θto/a,R)×K
2m (9)
where Θto is the measured top oil temperature, ∆Θto/a,R is
the difference in temperature between top oil and ambient at
rated current, K is the ratio of measured load to rated load,
and m is related to the cooling mode of the transformer.
The particle filter model is based on many different simula-
tions (i.e., particles) with different initial conditions and state
transition probabilities. At each simulation time step, the new
state of the system is evaluated given the previous state and the
probability of each particle is weighted using the likelihood
function so as to evaluate the true current state of the system.
See [16] for more details about the transformer degradation
and particle filtering implementation.
Through the repeated application of (8) and (9) with the
yearly historical load current and ambient and oil temperature
measurements (see Fig. 13 (a)), the Bayesian particle filter
model predicts the effect of various possible future conditions
on the transformer life.
In particular, we can assess the effect of overload condi-
tions on the transformer RUL estimation. We have evaluated
different hypothetical future operation conditions at different
prediction times, including overload conditions caused by
stochastic external events, which require additional cooling in
the power station by increasing the load up to 120%.
• Tp1=3y : 90% loaded for 3 years.
• Tp2=12y: 90% loaded for 11 years, 120% for others.
• Tp3=15y: 90% loaded for 11 years, 120% for others.
• Tp4=20y: 90% loaded for 14 years, 120% for others.
Note that these scenarios summarize the overall conditions,
but overload events can occur at different time instants with
different durations, e.g. one year of total overload in Tp2 can
be originated from three overload events occurring at 4, 7, and
10 year time instants which last for four months each.
Fig. 15 shows the PDF of the transformers’ RUL estimations
at different prediction times (Tp).
According to the analysed overload scenarios, we can
confirm that the increased overload condition has a direct
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Fig. 15. Transformer RUL values at different prediction times.
impact on the transformer degradation and RUL prediction,
in agreement with (8).
Based on the RUL estimations in Fig. 15 we update the
unavailability of the transformers in the dynamic dependabil-
ity model (Fig. 11) and check differences with the model
without updates. We have evaluated two different probabil-
ity distributions for the update of the transformer’s failure
distribution with prognostics values (Subsection II-A): the
exponential distribution with maximum likelihood RUL and
variance values and the Weibull distribution with its shape
(β) and scale (η) parameters. Table V displays equivalent
distribution parameters of PDFs in Fig. 15.
TABLE V
PARAMETERIZATION OF PDFS IN FIG. 15
Tp (m) Max. (m) Dev. (m) β η
Tp1 = 36 249.38 3.53 249.4 165.3
Tp2 = 144 233.47 3.6 233.4 170.3
Tp3 = 180 193.39 3.25 193.4 164.7
Tp4 = 240 166.21 3.06 166.2 110.8
Assuming non-repairable events, the cumulative distribution
function of the Weibull and exponential distributions are ex-
pressed through (1) with Tel = 0, and with Tel = 0 and η = 1,
respectively. Fig. 16 and Fig. 17 show the corresponding
cumulative distribution functions with the parameters extracted
from prognostics estimations.
Fig. 16. Non-repairable transformer CDF using Weibull distribution.
In Fig. 16, we can see that the use of the Weibull distribu-
tion results in an asset degradation behaviour which changes
rapidly due to the low variance of the RUL estimation.
Given that the transformer’s paper degradation process is
governed by the exponential law in (8), we have also modelled
the corresponding degradation behaviour in Fig. 17 using the
maximum likelihood RUL value as the failure rate parameter.
Fig. 17. Non-repairable transformer CDF using exponential distribution.
For this case study the exponential degradation is considered
more representative than the Weibull distribution. Besides,
note that if the Weibull RUL estimations are used with the
BDMP failure logic (cf. Fig. 10), it is always the case that
Fail Supply DBB1 = 0 because the Tr2 is in standby
operation until the failure of Tr1. This scenario makes over-
lapping failures of Tr1 and Tr2 impossible at any point in
time, i.e., Fail Supply DBB1 = 0.
Therefore we will use the exponential distribution with
λ(Tpi) ≈ 1/RUL for the failure rate update of circuit breakers
and transformers including the different prognostics results for
circuit breakers (Table IV) and transformers (Table V).
D. Prognostics-updated Unavailability Estimations
First we will focus on the prognostics-updated unavailability
estimations at the asset level and then we will evaluate the
system level unavailability according to the BDMP model in
Fig. 10. In order to compare the results we will also calcu-
late asset and system level unavailability without prognostics
information directly with parameters taken from Table II.
Let us first focus on the unavailability of transformers. The
failure behaviour of the transformers is defined in Fig. 10 as
the Fail Supply DBB1 event and this subsystem was previ-
ously developed in Fig. 6. The SAN models of Tr1 and Tr2
are shown in Fig. 11. Initially Tr1 is in working state and
Tr2 is in standby state. The synthesis example in Fig. 6 shows
which places are linked through the SAN join operator. When
Tr1 fails, Tr2 transits from standby to working state due to the
activation signal sent by the trigger mechanism and when Tr1
is repaired, Tr2 returns back to standby state (see triggered
Markov processes in Subsection II-B1).
Apart from the BDMP constructs validated in Fig. 12,
we update dynamically the failure rate of the transformer
as specified in Subsection II-D with prognostics prediction
results. Namely, up to the first prediction instant, we use the
average failure rate displayed in Table II. After predicting the
RUL at the first prediction time instant, we update the initial
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failure rate with the newly obtained RUL value. We apply the
same update process for the subsequent prediction instants and
values shown in Table V.
It is necessary to shift by 60 years the prediction instants in
Fig. 15 because the transformer monitoring data was obtained
at this time instant: Tp1=60y+3y=756m, Tp2=60y+12y=864m,
Tp3=60y+15y=900m, Tp4=60y+20y=960m. Fig. 18 shows
asset-level unavailability results for Tr1 with exponential
update parameters. Vertical dashed lines indicate prediction
instants and updates. Confidence intervals are obtained by
using the maximum and minimum RUL deviation values
(RUL ± Dev) in Table V as the failure distribution parameters.
Fig. 18. Unavailability with exponential update: Transformer Tr1.
In Fig. 18 we can see that there is a noticeable difference
between the reliability database estimate and the prognostics-
updated failure estimation using particle filtering results (cf.
Table V). The biggest differences can be identified at Tp1 (756
m) and Tp3 (900 m) due to the difference with the reliability
database information and applied overload conditions, respec-
tively. In this case the reliability database information is below
the prognostics-updated unavailability estimation because this
information does not take into account the specific overload
conditions applied to the model in (8) and (9).
The asset-level unavailability estimation process for circuit
breakers is similar to the transformers. The failure rate values
are updated with the circuit breaker prognostics prediction
parameters in Table IV. The failure behaviour of the cir-
cuit breakers is defined in Fig. 10 and the SAN models
are shown in Fig. 11. CB1 operates actively, whereas the
activation of CB2 is dependent on the trigger occurrence, i.e.
the Fail PS Diesel event occurrence. When this event occurs
CB2 is activated until the Fail PS Diesel event is repaired.
In the circuit breakers’ case it is necessary to shift by
61 years the prognostics prediction instants because the data
gathering architecture for circuit breakers was installed at 61
years: Tp1=61y+50d=734m, Tp2=61y+63d=734.5m. Fig. 19
shows asset-level unavailability results for the circuit breaker
CB1 with exponential update parameters.
Fig. 19 also shows that there is a considerable difference
between the unavailability of the circuit breaker updated with
linear regression compared with the static reliability estimation
using database values. As opposed to the previous case, the
circuit breaker unavailability estimation using the database in-
formation is more conservative compared with the probability
Fig. 19. Unavailability with exponential update: Circuit Breaker CB1.
estimate updated with real-time information. The SF6 data
shown in Fig. 13 (b) and Fig. 14 was captured during normal
operation and does not include stress conditions such as the
overload cases applied to the transformer.
In Figs. 18 and 19 we can see that the proposed approach
is able to update the average failure rate estimations using
prognostics information at the asset level. Depending on the
specific usage of the asset the updated unavailability can be
higher (transformer) or lower (circuit breaker) than the average
failure rate estimations. The same update process applies to
CB2 and Tr2.
The asset level models can be connected according to
the dynamic system failure logic so as to define the system
level failure occurrence and evaluate the system unavailability.
Accordingly using the SAN model shown in Fig. 11 with
the update process reported in Subsection II-D we have
evaluated the system-level unavailability. For circuit breakers
(CB1, CB2) and transformers (Tr1, Tr2) we update the initial
failure rate in Table II using the prognostics results displayed
in Table IV and V as shown in Figs. 18 and 19. For the
rest of assets (DBB1, DBA1, Diesel) we have taken failure
rates displayed in Table II. Fig. 20 shows the system-level
unavailability.
Fig. 20. Power supply of the distribution board: prognostics-updated system-
level unavailability.
Fig. 20 confirms that the average estimate of the unavailabil-
ity of the system changes when online prognostics information
is integrated. After applying the system failure logic shown
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in Fig. 10, the prognostics-updated system-level unavailability
estimation changes dynamically with asset-specific prognos-
tics prediction update values. When updating the unavailability
values with the circuit breaker results (t=734 m, t=734.5 m) the
prognostics-updated results are lower, whereas when updating
with the transformer prediction results (t=756 m, t=864 m,
t=900 m, t=960 m) the prognostics-updated unavailability is
higher.
Table VI displays mean values shown in Fig. 20.
TABLE VI
MEAN VALUES IN FIG. 20 USING DATABASE AND
PROGNOSTICS-UPDATED ESTIMATIONS
Time (m) Database (×10−5) Prognostics-updated (×10−5)
730 1.61 1.64
740 1.51 1.02
750 1.71 1.15
760 1.69 1.52
800 1.52 2.58
850 1.7 2.73
875 1.63 2.49
910 1.66 3.37
950 1.85 3.64
960 1.72 3.73
980 1.72 4.59
The unavailability calculation of asset-level and system-
level failure occurrences is performed by monitoring the
marking of the failure place (see Subsection II-C1). That is,
for Tr1 and CB1 we monitor the marking of the F place
of the corresponding SAN model (see Fig. 11), and for the
system-level failure occurrence we monitor the marking of
the top event gate which links all the asset-level models and
intermediate failure logic. In this case the top-event gate is an
OR gate (see Fail DBA1 in Fig. 10, and OR1 in Fig. 11) and
we monitor the marking of the place Y (Fig. 5 third row).
It is possible to calculate the PDF of the remaining useful
life at the system-level by calculating the derivative of the
unavailability shown in Fig. 20. However, the PDF of the
RUL is not representative on this occasion because the CDF
is almost stable at a fixed value after each update step (due to
the assets’ repair processes).
The prognostics-updated unavailability estimations showed
in Figs. 18-20 impact directly on the different dependability
attributes considered in this paper. The dynamic dependability
model quantifies the probability of occurrence of hazardous
events. With the consideration of prognostics information,
from the point of view of safety, a better picture of the
system health is obtained which can help to improve the
definition of safety margin values and avoid hazardous con-
sequences through up-to-date operational information. The
dynamic dependability model also includes repair actions,
and accordingly, the proposed approach provides indicators
to track the evolution of reliability and availability. In this
paper we have shown unavailability estimations, but assessing
the probability of being in the working state (see Fig. 5
first row) would lead directly to the availability assessment.
Finally, from the point of view of maintainability, the proposed
approach quantifies the effect of asset-specific prognostics
predictions on the system unavailability. On the one hand, it is
possible to minimize the RUL waste by defining a threshold
before failure occurrence and adopting maintenance actions
in a timely manner. On the other hand, it is possible to
save maintenance costs by evaluating the effect of asset-level
prognostics-updated unavailability estimations on the system-
level unavailability, by implementing waiting options until a
critical asset failure occurs.
IV. RELEVANT WORK
Dynamic dependability models analyse reliability, avail-
ability, maintainability and safety attributes (confidentiality
and integrity are outside the scope of this work). There are
dependability models that analyse these attributes from a
combinatorial failure logic perspective such as Fault Trees,
Reliability Block Diagrams, or Event Tree Analysis [47].
However, the failure of some systems (such as reconfigurable
and fault-tolerant systems) is caused by time-ordered event se-
quences and conditional triggering events which combinatorial
logic is not powerful enough to model [26], [48].
Dynamic dependability models enable the modelling and
probabilistic analysis of dynamic failure logic systems. There
are a range of dynamic dependability models that address
stochastic and temporal dependencies: BDMPs [20], Dynamic
Fault Trees (DFT) [49], [50], Dynamic Bayesian Networks
[51], [52], Dynamic Reliability Block Diagrams [53], State-
Event Fault Trees [54], Temporal Fault Trees [55], or hybrid
DFT models [56] (see [3] for a more complete overview of
dynamic dependability models).
For most of the dynamic dependability models the dynamic
criteria come from temporal and stochastic dependencies and
they assume a priori established dependability estimates. The
proposed approach can be situated within a recent body of
work aiming to integrate asset-specific operational data with
dependability models.
The link between Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and condition
monitoring was introduced with the concept of condition-
based FTA (CBFTA) [57]. Failure rate values of the ex-
ponential distribution were updated with predefined asset-
specific equations. Although this approach addresses relevant
properties for the integration of condition monitoring data,
prognostics and dynamic dependability concepts are not con-
sidered.
A Dynamic Bayesian Networks (DBN) centred method for
pre-warning of complex systems is introduced in [58]: Hazard
and Operability Study (HAZOP) is used to identify the DBN
structure; Markov chains are used to model the degradation
based on condition monitoring data, and a DBN is used to
evaluate conditional dependencies over different nodes using
the condition monitoring data. The safety assessment is based
on the inference of hidden states and prognostics focuses on
future reliability assessment.
Authors in [59], [60] integrate prognostics concepts with
system-level FTA for system level RUL estimation assuming
that asset-specific prognostics results are represented with
Gaussian probability density functions. The transformation
process from prognostics results into FTA is not addressed and
for the system-level reliability analysis classical non-repairable
FTA is used.
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Similarly, Kim et al. in [61] integrate prognostics results
with static FTA and ETA models to implement a real-time risk
monitor. The update process is governed by Bayes’ law, which
uses prognostics results as prior estimations. It provides a solid
direction for the analytic computation of prognostic-updated
parameters. Nonetheless, the static nature of the system failure
model may be too limiting for time-dependent scenarios.
Likewise, a dynamic failure methodology for the chemical
industry was presented in [62] comprising the following steps.
Initially, ETA is used to identify failure scenarios and Bayesian
prior estimations are initialized using generic data. Then the
posterior estimation is computed based on the likelihood
function. Finally, the process is updated with plant-specific
information. Dynamics come from the plant-dependent data,
but the failure specification logic is static and dependencies
between failures of different events are not considered.
Pattison et al. in [63] use DBN to represent the failure
behaviour of wind turbines and update the conditional fail-
ure probabilities of DBN nodes with condition monitoring
data estimated through a Kalman filter. Although dynamic
dependencies between assets are not modelled, asset-specific
information is used to update system-level failure probability
calculations.
It has been demonstrated that the Bayesian framework pro-
vides a solid theoretical framework to perform dependability
analyses with time-updated data. To this end, mathematical
expressions are required to specify the prior information and
the likelihood function for the posterior estimation. However,
when including dynamic asset dependencies, mathematical ex-
pressions become complicated for complex systems. See [64],
[65] for the algebraic framework of non-repairable dynamic
dependability.
Although prognostics techniques have been focused on the
component-level [12], [13], the system-level RUL prediction
problem is starting to attract the interest of researchers. Daigle
et al. in [66] proposed a distributed RUL estimation method
computed through the unscented Kalman filter and analytic
equations. The system RUL is defined as a violation of pre-
specified system behaviour constraints and this is projected
into individual subsystems. A valve model is analysed through
decomposing the system health into four health state estima-
tors and then the estimators are combined into two prediction
models. Finally, the system RUL is computed as the minimum
of all the distributed subsystem RULs, which are computed in
parallel through distributed stochastic simulations.
Recently Khorasgani et al. in [67] proposed a system-
level RUL prediction approach based on physics-of-failure
equations. The approach is applied to a rectifier case study
comprised of a transformer, two diodes, three capacitors and
an inductive load. Particle filtering is first applied to estimate
the system health state and then an extended version of the
first-order reliability method [68] is used to estimate the
system RUL based on the ripple factor of the output current.
The system degradation is modelled through the physics-of-
failure equations of capacitors, but the degradation models of
transformers and diodes are not considered.
Analytic equations are an elegant solution for the system-
level prognostics problem, but it is not always feasible to
integrate the physics-of-failure models of all the components
and their interactions. Besides, the system failure condition
which determines the final RUL varies from system to system.
Sometimes it can be defined as a performance indicator of
the system [66], [67], but there are situations in which time-
dependent failure occurrences of assets are needed to cause the
system failure [64], [65] and this complicates the analytical
treatment of the problem. In these situations, the applicability
of analytic equations for system-level RUL is challenging.
In summary, although there is work in linking condition
monitoring and prognostics to static dependability analysis
model, very little has been done with dynamic models.
Accordingly, we have focused on simulation techniques to
address dynamic asset dependencies while including asset-
specific prognostics results updated at runtime. We focused on
Stochastic Activity Networks because they are able to integrate
not only the Bayesian update process, but more complex
scenarios [69]. Our goal has not been to adhere to a single
prognostics technique, but instead establish a transformation
layer to use the results of any prognostics approach. Therefore,
the proposed framework is able to integrate independent
prognostics results into the dynamic dependability model.
V. DISCUSSION
The study confirms the hypothesis that the proposed frame-
work can be used to improve the dependability analysis in the
context of time-dependent scenarios compared with estima-
tions which use database reliability figures and static-logic de-
pendability assessment techniques. As shown in Fig. 20 there
is room to adopt fit-for-purpose operational and maintenance
decisions accounting for real-time system operation condi-
tions. However, the accuracy of the system-level unavailability
estimation and the application of the framework for real-time
risk monitoring tasks can be limited by the different issues
discussed in this section.
A. Accuracy of the System-level Prognostics Assessment
System-level prognostics estimation is an open problem in
the PHM field [6]. The system RUL prediction is more than
a simple combination of individual component failures [27],
[67] because there are stochastic and temporal dependencies
between assets that need to be taken into account.
In this direction, analytical techniques overcome time-
consuming simulation issues and they can integrate complex
detailed dependencies between variables. For simple systems
the use of analytic solutions may be feasible and provides
a faster solution. However, as the complexity of the system
increases, the implementation of analytical solutions is more
challenging. Analytical solutions become too complex for
systems which include for each asset or subsystem: time-
dependent behaviour, inter-dependencies, and alternative re-
pair strategies. If we include the complexity of the system
itself which can be comprised of many different assets and
subsystems (depending on the industry) it is not difficult
to see the advantage (and necessity) of using simulation
methods. Although detailed solutions to this problem have
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been proposed recently [67], we think that the scalability of
the approach can be an issue for complex systems.
The same situation happens with traditional dependability
and PSA techniques (see Table I). Although some of the low
level details may be lost, the analyst obtains a manageable
system-level approach. Accordingly the proposed modelling
process is inspired from well-defined dynamic dependability
analysis techniques.
In the proposed framework we have combined dynamic
dependability models with prognostics results so as to obtain
an up-to-date dependability assessment while accounting for
temporal and stochastic dependencies. To this end, we have
used BDMP and its trigger mechanism to capture depen-
dencies between assets, but it is possible to apply the same
framework with other dynamic dependability formalisms too.
Accordingly, the proposed solution enables the systematic
assessment of the system-level unavailability based on the
following steps (Fig. 1):
• Asset prognostics predictions and parametrization.
• Basic-events failure rate update.
• System-level dynamic failure logic.
• Top-event failure occurrence quantification.
The asset prognostics prediction model depends on the spe-
cific asset under study. These results need to be parametrized
according to the degradation behaviour so as to update failure
distributions of assets (see Subsection II-D). The system-level
dynamic failure logic defines the system degradation model
including the interactions between assets. For system-level
failure modelling and top-event failure occurrence quantifica-
tion we use BDMP [20] and SAN [21] models because they
are able to model dynamic and dependency properties with a
well-defined underlying mathematical foundation.
We acknowledge that all the low-level interactions may
not be taken into account with the proposed framework, but
this is a conscious trade-off decision that we adopt to enable
the systematic probabilistic assessment of prognostics-updated
complex systems.
B. Simulation Time
The duration of the Monte Carlo simulations depends on the
complexity of the system and the required level of accuracy
of the results. For all the presented results, the confidence
level is 0.99 and confidence interval is 1e-6. When updating
unavailability estimates with prognostics prediction results, the
resampling mechanism also adds computational complexity. In
the case study, the results start to converge after 5e6 iterations,
and simulation times can go up to 3 hours with a standard
desktop Intel i7 with 8 cores and parallel computing.
For repairable Markov processes it is possible to improve
the efficiency of the simulations based on the asymptotic
unavailability of the model [70] and this can be applied to the
BDMP models in Fig. 12. However, this cannot be applied
for all the cases analysed in this work because the asymptotic
behaviour depends on the prognostics prediction instants.
Some of the models quickly reach the asymptotic behaviour
(Fig. 19), but generally the proposed method will require
updating the unavailability estimates with new prognostics
prediction results and this will incur a continuous change in
the asymptotic behaviour (Fig. 20).
The applicability of the method for real-time risk monitoring
and maintenance planning is determined by the relation be-
tween simulation time and the prognostics prediction horizon.
With a long term prognostics prediction horizon the simulation
time is not an issue, but as we reach the end of life of a system,
the simulation time can become critical. However, note also
that for real-time risk monitoring tasks the predictions will be
focused on the short-term horizon and there is no need for
long-term predictions (e.g. months ahead as in Fig. 20) which
can reduce substantially the computational complexity.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have presented a framework which in-
tegrates traditional dynamic dependability assessment tech-
niques with prognostics estimations. The main benefit of the
proposed solution is the more realistic and accurate prediction
of the system unavailability. We have focused on general
properties so that it is possible to integrate other prognos-
tics and dynamic dependability analysis formalism into the
framework. To this end, it is necessary to adapt prognostics
results, and define transformation rules from any dynamic
dependability formalism into a formalism which is able to
integrate prognostics and any time-dependent failure logic.
Stochastic Activity Networks have shown to be valid for these
goals.
Another important aspect arising from this work is the adap-
tation between prognostics results and dynamic dependabil-
ity analysis techniques. For deterministic Remaining Useful
Life (RUL) prognostics estimations it is reasonable to use
the exponential distribution with the RUL estimation as a
failure rate parameter. However, the use of the Probability
Density Function (PDF) should be analysed on a case-by-case
basis depending on the degradation of the asset and target
application of the dynamic dependability model. The variance
of the PDF of the RUL determines the warning time of the
asset, i.e., with higher variance the warning time is longer
and vice versa. For safety applications in which the designer
needs a timely warning of the system degradation based on
failure thresholds, the narrow variance of RUL may prevent
the raising of a timely alarm. Therefore, it is necessary to
identify the degradation pattern of the system and model the
assets’ failure behaviour accordingly.
As for the future research activities we have identified four
key areas:
• Analysis of analytic techniques: study possible comple-
mentary techniques in order to find a feasible direction
for online risk estimation.
• Add more flexibility to the framework: although the
Weibull distribution is considered a general probability
distribution, it is possible to add more flexibility to the
framework through customized distributions.
• Analysis of the uncertainty propagation: evaluate other
methods to propagate prognostics results, e.g. multiagent
systems [6].
• Comparison of maintenance strategies with respect to
dependability and cost.
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APPENDIX
Before formally defining a Stochastic Activity Networks
model, let us define concepts related with the marking of
the net. Let P denote the set of places of the network. If
S is a set of places (S ⊆ P ), a marking of S is a mapping
µ : S → N. Similarly, the set of possible markings of S is the
set of functions MS = {µ|µ : S → N}. Formally a Stochastic
Activity Networks model is defined as follows [21]:
A Stochastic Activity Network (SAN) model is a 5 tuple
SAN =< AN,µ0, C, F,G > where,
• AN is the activity network, which is a 8 tuple
AN =< P,A, IG,OG, γ, τ, i, o >, where
– P is some finite set of places.
– A is a finite set of activities.
– IG is a finite set of input gates; each input gate
ig ∈ IG defined as a triple ig = (g, ena, f) where
G ⊆ P is the set of places associated with the gate,
ena : MG → {0, 1} is the enabling predicate of the
gate, and f :MG →MG is the input function of the
gate.
– OG is a finite set of output gates, each output gate
og ∈ OG defined as a pair og = (G, f).
– γ : A→ N+ specifies the number of cases for each
activity.
– τ : A→ {timed, instantaneous} specifies the type
of each activity.
– i : IG→ A maps input gates to activities.
– o : OG → {(a, c)|a ∈ [1, γ(a)]} maps output gates
to cases of activities.
• µ0 ∈MP is the initial stable marking.
• C is the case distribution assignment.
• F is the activity time distribution function assignment.
An assignment of continuous functions to timed activities
such that for any timed activity a, Fa :MP ×R→ [0, 1].
Furthermore, for any stable marking µ ∈MP and timed
activity a that is enabled in µ, Fa(µ, ·) is a continuous
probability distribution function called the activity time
distribution function of a in µ; Fa(µ, τ) = 0 if τ ≤ 0.
• G is the reactivation function assignment, an assignment
of functions to timed activities such that for any timed
activity a,Ga : MP → P(MP ), where P(MP ) denotes
the power set of MP . Furthermore, for any stable mark-
ing µ ∈ MP and timed activity a that is enabled in
µ,Ga(µ, ·) is a set of markings called the reactivation
markings of a in µ.
The graphical representation and informal description of
these constructs can be found in Subsection II-C1. Note that
we have deliberately defined case distribution assignments
C at a high level because in this work we have not used
these constructs. Refer to [21] for more details about the
behaviour of Stochastic Activity Networks, Theorems, Proofs,
and computation algorithms. Refer to [22] for more details
about the implementation framework.
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